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Abstract:  
In this paper, we propose a new multidimensional inequality index that satisfies a 
fundamental set of desired properties. We discuss the case where the social evaluation 
function of welfare depends simultaneously on unidimensional and multidimensional 
forms of inequality. We show how this mixed social norm interferes with the most 
popular axioms conceived specifically for multidimensional indices of inequality. 
Illustrations of the proposed developments are made using the Cameroonian household 
surveys, conducted in 2001. It is shown that multidimensional inequality is more 
pronounced in the Cameroonian semi-urban and rural areas whereas the monetary 
inequality is more pronounced in urban area. 
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1 Introduction
Why is the multidimensional inequality (MDI) important to be quantified and
analyzed? Why should not we focus on income inequality only? When is MDI
relevant? What does the concept multidimensional inequality refer to? In devel-
oping countries, there is a growing interest to focus on the distributive analysis of
well-being with its multidimensional form. Indeed, it is impossible to monetize
all types of goods and services. One can recall here that many non-monetized
goods can be found in developing countries and where the public sector provides
the main part of collective goods. In addition, for other goods, it is difficult to
monetize them even in developed countries, like the expectancy life rate.
The developments of Sen (1982) about the welfare economics have con-
tributed radically in redefining this concept. With the Sen’s capability approach,
we are based on the assessment of a person’s advantage, individual differences
in the ability to transform resources into valuable activities. Starting from this,
the minimum required set of functioning will be sufficient for the person to have
the freedom to choose and to lead freely the desired life style. Even if one can
agree on the importance of assessing and monitoring the deprivation in these dif-
ferent dimensions of well-being, one can also agree for the need of assessing the
inequality in distribution of these non monetary dimensions. For instance, even if
the provision of a given public service, like education, has significantly expanded,
the bad repartition of this expansion may prevent most of the population to reach
these services and will increase the inequality in well-being in general.
The extension of the Pigou-Dalton Principle from unidimensional to the mul-
tidimensional form of well-being was pioneered by Kolm (1977). Even if the pro-
posed set of social norms that determine the dominance criteria are well founded,
they fail to establish a complete order of preferences. One can recall here that
this is, sometimes, the case with the unidimensional inequality.1 As noted by
Lugo (2005) for the multidimensional inequality, the use of indices became more
attractive to establish the complete order of preferences.
Among the fundamental axioms that concern to multidimensional inequality
is Uniform Majorization Principle (UPM) (Kolm (1977)). The latter stipulates
that the change in distribution is socially desirable if the latter is implied by a
decrease in inequality within attributes without increasing the unidimensional in-
equality (for simplicity, we call it: income inequality). The interdependent form
of equalization of attributes insures the unidirectional change in the two forms of
1A classical example is when the two Lorenz curves cross.
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inequality. However, this reduces the set of mappings for which one can take a
clear judgment about the nature of change in MDI .
The second fundamental axiom is the Correlation Increasing Majoriza-
tion (CIM). This axiom was introduced by Tsui (1999) (See again
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Boland and Proschan (1988) , Tsui (1995),
(1999) and (2002)). This axiom assumes that it is socially undesirable to have a
higher correlation between components. In this paper, we propose to use the uni-
dimensional inequality to catch indirectly the impact of this correlation. Indeed,
for the same level of inequality within components, an increase in this correla-
tion implies an increase in income inequality. This argument justifies in part why
we propose linking the MDI form of inequality to the unidimensional inequality.
Moreover, imposing this axiom enlarges the set of mappings for which one can
take a clear judgment about the change in multidimensional inequality.
The rest of the paper is as follow. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework
and the related developments for the proposed hybrid multidimensional index of
inequality. Section 3 then studies the multidimensional inequality in Cameroon
and this by used a national representative household survey, conducted in 2001.
Section 4 summarizes the main results of the paper.
2 The theoretical framework
To what refer the concept inequality? In general, it refers to the disparity
between individual incomes. Any reduction in disparity between two unequal
incomes will reduce the level of inequality. Let us recalling the main set of prin-
ciples that all inequality indices must obey.
1. Anonymity principle: Inequality indices are independent of any character-
istic of individuals other than their standards of living (or the value of their
welfare indicator).
2. Population principle: The population principle requires that inequality in-
dices be invariant to replications of the population: merging two identical
distributions should not alter inequality.
3. The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle: It stipulates that an income transfer
from a poorer person to a richer person should register as a rise (or at least
not as a fall) in inequality.
In the literature of inequality, there are two main distinct concepts of inequality,
which are:
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1. Absolute inequality: It refers to the disparity between incomes. Then,
adding the same amount to all individuals will not interfere with the level
of disparity between incomes.
2. Relative inequality: It refers to the disparity between income shares. Then,
multiplying the incomes by a scalar will not interfere with the level of dis-
parity between income shares.
If we assume that the social welfare will depends positively on average stan-
dards of living -income- and negatively on inequality, we can recall the two main
compact social evaluation functions, denoted by S(.).
- Absolute approach: S(IA, µ) = µ− IA ∈ [0, µ];
- Relative relative: S(IR, µ) = 1− IR
µ
∈ [0, 1],
where IA and IR denote respectively the absolute and relative inequality indices,
and µ the average income. Among the popular inequality indices that leads to
these compact social welfare evaluation functions, one can cite that of Gini and
that of Atkinson. The presented previous basic notions will help us introducing the
main desirable social norms for the quantification of multidimensional inequality.
Let the matrix of achievements (or income components) of N individuals for
the K dimensions be denoted by X ∈ RNK , that take the following form:
X =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x1,1 · · · x1,k · · · x1,K
xn,1 xn,k
.
.
.
xN,1 xN,2 · · · xN,K
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1)
One can recall here thatMDI indices are mappings that take the form I : RNK →
R, and used to quantify the multidimensional inequality. These indices must obey
a set of social norms, that we assume also represent the main ingredients to con-
ceive the social evaluation function and assess the social welfare. Let the matrix
Y ∈ RNK be an alternative distribution of achievements obtained with a given
mapping: γ ∈ Γ, such that, γ : X → Y ∈ RNK . At this stage, let us focus on
some subsets of mappings, which may be of interest to establish the ordinal social
preferences, presented in Table (1):
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Table 1: Multidimensional inequality and social norms
Subsets Normative constraints Y is weakly preferable than X by different norms
ΓAinc X,Y ∈ RNK Y Ainc X
if: S(IAy , µy) ≥ S(IAx , µx)
ΓAdim X,Y ∈ RNK Y Adim X
if: S(IA
Y
, µy) ≥ S(I
A
X
, µx)
ΓAinc,dim X,Y ∈ RNK Y Ainc,dim X
if: S(IAy , µy, IAY, µY) ≥ S(IAx , µx, IAX, µX)
ΓRinc X,Y ∈ RNK+∗ and µx = µy Y Rinc X
if: S(IRy , µy) ≥ S(IRx , µx)
ΓRdim X,Y ∈ RNK+∗∗ and µxk = µyk∀k Y Rdim X
if: S(IR
Y
, µY) ≥ S(I
R
X
, µX)
ΓRinc,dim X,Y ∈ RNK+∗∗ and µxk = µyk∀k Y Rinc,dim X
if: S(IRy , µy, IRY, µY) ≥ S(IRx , µx, IRX, µX)
ΓB X,Y ∈ RNK+∗∗ Y B X
Y = BX , B is a bistochastic matrix.
ΓT X,Y ∈ RNK+∗∗ Y T X
Y = TX , T is a Pigou-Dalton transfer matrix.
S() : Social evaluation function.
IAx : Absolute income inequality in X .
µx : Average income in X .
I
A
X
= {IAx1 , I
A
x2
, . . . , IAxK} and I
A
xk
is the absolute inequality on component k in X .
µX = {µx1, µx2 , . . . , µxK} and µxk is the average of component k in X .
Y Ainc X : Y is weakly preferred than X with the absolute income inequality norm.
Y Rinc X : Y is weakly preferred than X with the relative income inequality norm.
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ΓA∗: This set of mappings contains less restrictive conditions considering the do-
main of definition of X and Y and where values of attributes can be nega-
tive. Further, there are no conditions of equality of average income between
X and Y or between those of their components. These less restrictive con-
ditions are more appropriate with the well-known absolute inequality norm.
ΓAinc: Social preferences are based on absolute income inequality, without
focusing on absolute inequality within components. This requires im-
plicitly the income-invariance constant axiom (IIC), which implies
that our order of preferences remains unchanged by adding a constant
amount to income vector (or to any one of the components).
ΓAdim : Social preferences are based on the absolute inequality within compo-
nents, and this, without focusing on absolute inequality of income.
This requires implicitly the component invariance constant axiom
(CIC) and implies that our order of preferences remains unchanged by
adding a constant amount to each component: if X  Y ⇒ X +C 
Y + C where C ∈ RNK , ci,k = Ck ∀i and Ck ∈ R.
ΓAinc,dim : Social preferences are based on the two forms of inequality (income
and components). Here, axioms (CIC) and (IIC) are required.
ΓR∗: With this subset of applications, we focus in establishing rules of social
preferences considering the MDI with the relative inequality norm.
ΓRinc : Social preferences are based on the relative inequality of income, with-
out focusing on the relative inequality within components. The nota-
tion RNK+∗ implies simply that at least, we have a positive value in one
column. This insures that average incomes are not nil. The natural ax-
iom, that is required for this case, is the income-invariance scale (IIS).
In other words, multiplying all components (or income vector) by the
same scalar does not interfere with the social order of preferences.
ΓRdim : Social preferences are based on the relative inequality within compo-
nents, without focusing on relative inequality of income. The nota-
tion RNK+∗∗ indicates simply that, at least, we have a positive value in
each column, and consequently, µk > 0 ∀k. In addition, we assume
that: γRdim : Y = V X , when the sum of each row-stochastic matrix
V ∈ RNN+∗∗ equals to 1. The natural axiom, that is required in this case,
is the component-invariance scale (CIS). This axiom is equivalent to
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the well-known Strong Homotheticity axiom, which requires: Y ≡ X
if Y = ΛX and Λ is a diagonal matrix with λi,i ∈ R+∗ .
ΓRinc,dim : Social preferences are based on the two forms of inequality. The re-
quired axioms here are the IIS and CIS. Also, this is equivalent to
the well-known Weak Homotheticity axiom: Y ≡ X if Y = λX and
the scalar λ ∈ R+
∗
.
The two following subsets are special cases of ΓRinc,dim . Note that in general, we
have: ΓT ⊂ ΓB ⊂ ΓRi,k ⊂ ΓRk ⊂ ΓRi .
ΓT We assume that Y is obtained by multiplying X by a Pigou-Dalton Trans-
fer matrix T . The matrix T = δE + (1 − δ)Π, where E and Π are the
identity and row-permutation matrices respectively and the scalar δ ∈ [0, 1].
For instance, if the mapping γT implies simply a change in components of
two individuals i1 and i2 (pii,i = 1 ∀i 6= i1, i2), this mapping will reduce
inequality within components and within income. One can recall here that
with this norm, our indices obey the well-known Uniform Pigou-Dalton
Majorization Principle (UPM). However, clearly with this norm, one can-
not establish a complete order of preferences. For instance, how can one
say about the change in inequality if the transformation do not take the T
scheme?
ΓB We assume that Y is obtained by multiplying X by a bistochastic matrix
B ∈ RNN++ . A matrix is bistochastic if the values of each row or column
are non negative adding up to one. Except for the case where B is an iden-
tity matrix, the mapping γB reduces inequality in minimum within one at-
tribute and that of income. One can recall here that this mapping rule was
used to develop the well-known Uniform Majorization Principle (UM).
Kolm (1977) gives different intuitive interpretations on the nature of equal-
ization operating by using intermediately the bistochastic B matrix. The
interdependent equalization of components with this mapping form, makes
the distribution of attributes more equal (non decreasing for weak prefer-
ences). The interdependence constraint implies in its turn, a decrease in
income inequality. Evidently, the γB mappings may be used to establish the
order of preferences when the decrease in component inequalities does not
increase that of income. However one cannot take a clear judgment when
the change in the two forms of inequality have opposite directions.
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The society may be averse to inequality in achievements -components- with
the consensus about the necessity of ensuring minimum levels to each person. For
instance, the society may be highly averse to the inequality in education attain-
ments and less to the access to public network transportation. The difference in
social aversion toward the inequality across dimensions may justify focusing on
the multidimensional form of inequality. In general, we can start our reflection
with the following two main social preoccupations for the MDI purpose:
A1: Multidimensional Sensitivity (MDS): The society is sensitive to the in-
equality within each dimension -component-. This sensitivity may differ
across dimensions.
A2: Unidimensional Sensitivity (UDS): The society is sensitive to the inequal-
ity in standards of living of persons (to simplify, we call it: income inequal-
ity).
However, [A1] and [A2] may have opposite effects. Assume that the poor has
a level of a given component higher than that of the rich and the change is by per-
forming more equalization within this component. How do the proposed axioms
interfere with this example? Clearly, the decrease in inequality within compo-
nent will contribute in decreasing MDI (A1 acts for this first aspect). However,
by considering the well-being at individual level, this change will contribute in
increasing the MDI (A2 acts for this second aspect).
For a given level of income inequality (individual income remains constant),
the individual (social decision maker (SDM) for the provision of public goods)
can improve the well-being by selecting the optimal bundle of attributes given the
level of the individual income. A social decision maker will prefer the distribution
that generates more social welfare. Then, for a given level of income inequality,
there is an optimal level of inequality between attributes at individual level. A
special case is when preferences are homothetic and homogeneous (the same for
the whole population). In this case, individualistic preferences make income in-
equality equals to that of each attribute. When attributes are normalized by their
averages, inequality within individual attributes must be nil.
With the welfarist approach, one has to specify explicitly the individualistic
utility, like what was proposed by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), to assess ac-
curately the impact of interaction between components on individual well-being.
However, this approach may be criticized for the following reasons. First, using
the individualistic measurement of well-being reduces the multidimensional con-
cept to its unidimensional space, and we are interested simply to the inequality in
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standards of living or explicitly the quantified individual utility. Second, in gen-
eral, when the horizontal aggregation is made at first stage (evaluated individual
utility), it is difficult to disentangle the contribution of inequalities within com-
ponents into MDI index. In other words, this empties the MDI concept from
its meaning. Third, the proposed individualistic utility functions are not derived
from empirical estimations, but are imposed to respect some ad-hoc axioms.2 Ob-
viously, for the ordinal preferences over income inequality, one can propose any
concave social evaluation function to assess the level of inequality. However, this
proposal cannot be transposed at the level of attributes for the individualistic util-
ity. indeed, the latter must be well specified to continue to have its cardinal nature
as a measurement of the individual well-being. Forth, this proposed index by
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) was derived with the relative approach and the
author assume the non existence of negative values of attributes. However, some
methods, like those based on the factorial analysis, quantify components in R.
One can note that with the (CIM) axiom, decreasing the correlation be-
tween individual attributes by keeping the levels of inequality within compo-
nents unchanged (for instance, by interchanging individual attributes to de-
crease the correlation:
∣∣∣∣
1 6
2 9
∣∣∣∣ →
∣∣∣∣
2 6
1 9
∣∣∣∣), decreases income inequality.
Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) raised some reservations about this axiom
and where the latter seems to impose the substitution criteria between attributes.
In our view, this axiom may be related to the impact on income inequality. It is
clear that the increase in this correlation increases income inequality even with
the additive utilitarian approach. In addition, the impact of change in the dis-
tribution of components on the individual well-being may depend on the nature
of attributes (complements/substitutes/etc.). Further, when MDI indices do not
obey the CIM axiom, they are not sensitive to the row inequality. Among the
MDI indices that not obey the CIM axiom, is the unidimensional indices of in-
equality. For instance, one can use the Atkinson index to assess inequality in the
distribution ({1, 2, 6, 9} for our example above. The other case is when the MDI
index is the average of inequalities within components.
At this stage, let us review the social evaluation function (S), when the society
is only sensitive to one form of inequality.
Perfect sensitivity to income inequality
Assume that the society is perfectly sensitive to the inequality of income and in-
2Precisely, the scale independence axiom requires an utility function with constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) form.
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sensitive to the inequality within components. This implies also that our set of
multidimensional indices obey the well-known Income Pigou-Dalton Transfer ax-
iom. Social welfare increases with the reduction in income inequality even if the
change generates more inequality within components (the richer may have lower
level in some components). Assume that the social evaluation function Sinc is
used to assess the level of social welfare with the relative norm: Sinc = f(µ, I).
In this case, the usual unidimensional inequality indices can be used to assess the
level of inequality and one can write:
I inc = 1−
Sinc
µ
(2)
where Sinc is the level of social welfare. When the Gini social welfare is used, we
have then:
I inc =
K∑
k=1
ϕkCk (3)
where ϕk and Ck are the total income share and the coefficient of concentration of
component k respectively.3 One can note that in the case where we cannot estab-
lish a uniform scale of measurement across attributes, we can set ϕk = 1/K ∀k
or µk = µl∀k 6= l and the I inc index continues to be sensitive to the correlation
across components.
In what case this approach will be sufficient to assess the multidimensional in-
equality? Evidently this approach may be used if the distinction between compo-
nents does not make any sense or, where they are perfect substitutes. In an extreme
case, if all these components are monetized, one cannot distinguish between the
dollar spent on a given component and that spent on another component. Among
the well desired axioms that MDI indices must obey with this social norm, we
cite:
A3: Weak Anonymity (WAN): MDI indices do not depend on the individual
characteristics except its standards of living or its income for simplicity.
A4: Weak Normalization (WNM): If each person has the average income, then
the MDI indices equals to zero.
Perfect sensitivity to inequality within components
3For the decomposition of the Gini index by income components, see Pyatt (1976),
Lambert and Aronson (1993) and Araar (2006).
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Assume that the society is sensitive to the inequality within each component,
but insensitive to income inequality. In such case, it is natural to assume that
the social evaluation function is simply the sum of the K unidimensional social
welfare functions. Let Sk denotes the social evaluation function of the kith dimen-
sion and Sk its level. The function Sk depends on the average of component k,
denoted by µk, and inequality within the component.4 We denote the social eval-
uation function with this pure multidimensional norm by Sdim =
K∑
k=1
Sk.
5 When
Sk = µk(1− Ik), the MDI index can be written as follows:
Idim = 1−
Sdim
µ
=
K∑
k=1
ϕkIk (4)
where Ik is the index of inequality of component k.6
When is this approach sufficient to assess the multidimensional inequality? Ev-
idently, this approach may be used where components are perfect complements.
Among the well desired axioms that MDI indices must obey with this social
norm are:
A5: Strong Anonymity (SAN): MDI indices do not depend on the individual
characteristics except their levels of achievements or income components
for simplicity.
A6: Strong Normalization (SNM): If each person has the average component
-achievement-, then MDI indices equals to zero.
These two situations, for which the society is sensitive to only one form of
inequality, represent the two extreme cases of social preferences. It is rational to
assume that the society may desire to reduce inequality within components with-
out hurting, as much as possible, the situation of the poor. When the change in the
distribution has two opposite effects, like the case where the reduction in inequal-
ity within a given component k increases the income inequality, the net effect on
4This simplified representation does not impose beforehand the component-separability criteria
for the individualistic utility function.
5Note that, with the Gini social welfare function, Sdim = Sinc if each of component ranks
persons similarly to the income rank.
6Note that in this case, the index Idim may be obtained with the counterfactual distribution of
income where the poorer have the sum of all minimum levels of components, the second poorer
have the sum of second minimum levels and so on.
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S will depend on social preferences trade-off between these two effects (How the
society is more sensitive to one type of inequality rather than the other). Assume
that the vector of K parameters, denoted by λ, represents the social preferences
for this issue. The hybrid social evaluation function can take the following linear
form:
S =
K∑
k=1
λkν
dim
k + (1− λk) ν
inc
k (5)
where νωk is simply the contribution of the kth component to the S social welfare
function with norms ω ∈ [dim, inc].
To assess income inequality under uncertainty,
Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997) have proposed a multiple-priors
functional form J . The context of the problematic that they treat is practically
similar to that of MDI and we have to perform two successive stages of
aggregations (J1 ∗ J2, J2 ∗ J1). For the inequality under uncertainty, one can
estimate the expected income and thus, estimate income inequality or estimate
the expected index of inequality of the different potential distributions of income.
The notation J1 ∗ J2, denotes the case where the operator J2 is applied to each
row matrix at the first stage (row aggregation at the first stage). The compact and
convex function J takes the form: J = α(J1 ∗ J2) + (1 − α)(J2 ∗ J1) where
α ∈ [0, 1]. As noted by Gajdos and Weymark (2005), when J1 is the relative Gini
operator and J2 is the expected operator with uniform probability of distribution
over K components, J respects the CIM axiom when α 6= 0.7 Thus, the MDI
index that we propose may be viewed as a generalization of this result by focusing
on the trade-off between the two forms of inequality considering contributions of
each component. In the case where λi > λj , the society is more sensitive to the
inequality within component i comparatively to that within j. When we use the
Gini social welfare function, the relative MDI index takes the following form:
IR =
K∑
i=1
ϕk [λkIk + (1− λk)Ck] (6)
In general, performing more equalization in a given component (k) may have
mitigated impact on MDI , and this, depending on Ik, Ck and the parameter λk.
7Even if the problematic of quantifying MDI that we discuss in this paper and that of in-
equality under uncertainty, treated by Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997)) are different,
the juxtaposition of these two problematics may be done by assuming that each of the terms
( µ
µk
∗ componentk) represents the income vector in state k with probability ( 1K ).
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Graphically, one can plot the difference between Lorenz curve of income and that
of concentration of component k to expect the impact of the marginal component
equalization on the MDI index, and this by assuming, for instance, that the pa-
rameter λk equals to 0.5. MDI indices, which are simultaneously sensitive to the
two forms of inequality must obey the following axiom:
A7: Joint Sensitivity (JOS): MDI indices will be sensitive to the uni and mul-
tidimensional inequalities simultaneously.
Under the absolute inequality norm, the proposed developments are practi-
cally similar and the absolute MDI index takes the following form:
IA =
K∑
i=1
[λkAIk + (1− λk)ACk] (7)
where , AIk and ACk denotes the absolute Gini and absolute coefficient of con-
centration respectively. Moreover, the proposed index satisfies a set of desirable
properties for MDI indices. Among the implications of the proposed compact
hybrid index, one can cite the following:
- Compact functional form: For all possible values λk ∈ [0, 1] one can
prove easily that our index is bounded between 0 and 1. This result is
because of Ik ≥ |Ck|. Hence, its is sufficient to agree with this trivial
weak inequality to prove that:
∑K
i=1 ϕk [λk |Ck|+ (1− λk) (Ck)] ≥ 0 and∑K
i=1 ϕk [λkIk + (1− λk) (Ik)] ≤ 1.
- UPM principle: The proposed index obeys to the UPM principle for all
λk ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that with the T transformation, inequality within com-
ponents, as well as, within income decreases. Hence the decrease in the
proposed index is trivial.
- UM principle: The proposed index obeys to the UM principle for all λk ∈
[0, 1], since the B transformation makes inequality within components and
that of income lower.
- Correlation Increasing Majorization (CIM): This axiom was introduced
by Tsui (1999). Recall that with this axiom, it is socially undesirable to
have a higher correlation between components. When λk 6= 1 our index is
sensitive to this form of correlation and respects this axiom.
13
- Decomposability by component (DEC): The proposed index is decompos-
able by attributes or components and according to the two forms of inequal-
ity. This axiom must be strongly required for MDI indices to design easily
the anti-inequality policies based on the contribution of each component.
What is the link between λ and the nature of components? As reported above,
when the component k is a perfect substitute of the other set of components, it is
appropriate to set λk to zero. In contrast, if the component is a perfect comple-
ment, λk will converge to one.
As reported before, when the comparison concerns the case where inequal-
ities in all components and that of income decrease, it is easy to take a clear
judgment about the nature of change in multidimensional inequality. The com-
plication arises when the comparison concerns the case of increase in inequality
of some components and a decrease for the others. This implies to consider the
total impact at the individual level. Under the welfarist approach, one must define
explicitly the functional form of the individualistic utility to assess the trade-off
in such case. Evidently, if we have a complete information about the individual-
istic functional form, we can propose more refined MDI indices. However, one
must take a trade-off between this simplified and operational proposed approach
and that when an individualistic function is specified without any empirical vali-
dation.
3 Application
To illustrate how these proposed developments may be used to quantify and
analyze the multidimensional inequality, we use the Cameroonian Household Sur-
vey (ECAM II: Enqueˆte Camerounaise Aupre`s des Me´nages) conducted by the
National Institute of Statistics in 2001. This is a national survey with a sample
of about 11,000 households selected randomly using two stages in the urban ar-
eas and three for the rural areas. Besides the detailed information on household
expenditures, this sample contains rich information about the non monetary di-
mensions of well-being, such as the access to public goods. For our application,
we focus on three dimensions of well-being, which are the housing, education and
health basic infrastructures.
As is well-known, there is no unique indicator as a measure for a given di-
mension of well-being at the individual level. In general, one has to quantify
this level starting from a set of primary indicators, which will be strongly related
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to the dimension that they represent (see the Appendix 1 for more information
about the retained basic indicators). Starting from the fact that all used indicators
are categorical, we propose to use the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA)
technique to estimate the individual normalized scores, and this, for each of the
three retained dimensions of well-being. One can recall here that the MCA is the
application of the simple correspondence analysis to multivariate categorical data,
coded as an indicator matrix or a Burt matrix.8 The level of well-being of the
individual i for a given dimension is quantified as follows:
Wi =
∑K
k=1
∑Jk
jk=1
wjkIi,jk
K
(8)
where K is the number of categorical variables, Jk the number of categories for
indicator k, Ii,jk the binary indicator taking 1 if the individual i has the category
jk and wjk is the normalized first axis score of the category jk.9
To sum up, after reducing the information from the
∑
k Jk dimensions to the
fewest one, the reduced space preserves the main disparities in well-being. Pre-
cisely, the main part of this disparity is projected on the first axis -factor- of the
reduced space. This is the reason for which one can use the categorical scores
of the first axis as categorical weights. In Appendix 2, we show the housing cat-
egorical indicators in bi-dimensional reduced space. As one can observe, after
inverting the sign of scores,10 all categories related to the best quality of housing
have higher scores.
In Figure 1, we plot the density curves of each of the three dimensions of
well-being according to the household living area.11 As expected, urban house-
holds have better scores in housing, education and sanitary infrastructures com-
pared to those that live in semi-urban and rural areas. However, how is the level
of multidimensional inequality within each Cameroonian region? To explore this
and to quantify the MDI with the absolute approach, we use the proposed hybrid
MDI index. For simplicity, we assume that the parameter λk is the same for all k.
For the relative approach and since relative inequality indices are not defined with
negative indicators of well-being, we perform a linear transformation by translat-
8See, for instance, Benaze´cri (1979), Greenacre (1984) and Greenacre (1993).
9Precisely, the normalized weight refers to the score on the first axis, normalized by the square
root of its correspondent eigenvalue.
10We recall here that this inversion does not interfere with the score results obtained by using
the MCA method.
11The DASP Stata package was used to carry the main part of results of the application. For
more information, see also Araar and Duclos (2007).
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ing individual scores by the distance between the minimum of scores and zero.
Further, we normalize each dimension by its mean. In Tables 2 and 3 we present
Figure 1: Density curves of the synthetic indices for the three dimensions of well-
being
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results of MDI indices by the Cameroonian areas and provinces. Starting from
these results, one can remark the higher level in multidimensional inequality in
rural area, and this with both approaches. As shown again in Appendix 2, while
the monetary inequality is what characterize the urban area, the non monetary
inequality is more pronounced in rural area. Thus, the first conclusion that one
can draw concerns the disparities in housing, education and health facilities in the
Cameroonian semi-urban and rural areas. This result may induce policymakers
to review the planned expansions in the provision of public services and reduce
these disparities in priority within the more unequal provinces in Cameroon.
Concerning the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the parameter λk,
we find that the rank based on MDI may change with the selected level of this
parameter (for instance, see the ordinal rank between Adamaoua and Extreme-
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Table 2: Estimated MDI indices by areas and provinces (absolute approach)
λ = 0.0 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.9 λ = 1.0
Areas
Urban 0.291 0.266 0.312 0.358 0.369
Semi-Urban 0.314 0.286 0.338 0.390 0.402
Rural 0.391 0.357 0.406 0.456 0.468
Provinces and main cities
Douala 0.263 0.240 0.289 0.337 0.350
Yaounde 0.227 0.207 0.252 0.297 0.308
Adamaoua 0.512 0.466 0.495 0.525 0.532
Center 0.419 0.382 0.419 0.457 0.466
EST 0.403 0.367 0.409 0.450 0.460
Extreme-North 0.399 0.363 0.405 0.448 0.458
Litoral 0.328 0.299 0.346 0.392 0.404
North 0.459 0.418 0.461 0.504 0.515
North-west 0.401 0.365 0.398 0.432 0.440
West 0.368 0.335 0.382 0.429 0.441
South 0.369 0.336 0.372 0.408 0.417
South-west 0.432 0.394 0.441 0.488 0.499
Cameroon 0.519 0.473 0.515 0.557 0.568
North provinces for λk = 0 and λk = 1 in Table 3). This result confirms the
sensitivity ofMDI indices to the adopted properties thatMDI indices must obey.
Among the desired properties of the proposed MDI index is its decompos-
ability by components or dimensions of well-being. In Table 4, we present the
results of decomposition of the relative MDI when the parameter λk is set to 0.5.
The first remark is the higher contribution of housing dimensions to total MDI .
This result is expected being given the high correlation between this dimension
and the unequal monetary indicator. The second remark concerns the contribu-
tion of education which is higher compared to that of health. This may incite the
policy makers to reexamine the planed expansions in public goods and to reduce
disparities in access to this service.
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Table 3: Estimated MDI indices by areas and provinces (relative approach)
λ = 0.0 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.9 λ = 1.0
Areas
Urban 0.085 0.078 0.091 0.105 0.108
Semi-Urban 0.110 0.100 0.117 0.134 0.138
Rural 0.200 0.182 0.205 0.228 0.233
Provinces and main cities
Douala 0.072 0.065 0.080 0.094 0.098
Yaounde 0.061 0.056 0.069 0.081 0.084
Adamaoua 0.238 0.217 0.229 0.241 0.244
Center 0.185 0.169 0.185 0.201 0.205
East 0.191 0.174 0.190 0.206 0.210
Extreme-North 0.229 0.209 0.232 0.255 0.261
Litoral 0.121 0.110 0.124 0.139 0.142
North 0.280 0.255 0.276 0.296 0.301
North-west 0.179 0.163 0.175 0.187 0.190
West 0.150 0.137 0.153 0.169 0.173
South 0.148 0.135 0.148 0.160 0.163
South-west 0.152 0.138 0.153 0.168 0.171
Cameroon 0.219 0.199 0.214 0.228 0.232
Table 4: Decomposition of relative MDI by well-being dimensions (λk = 0.5)
Housing Education Health Total (MDI)
The absolute contribution
Urban 0.042 0.025 0.024 0.091
Semi-Urban 0.055 0.037 0.026 0.117
Rural 0.091 0.070 0.044 0.205
Cameroon 0.110 0.064 0.039 0.214
The relative contribution (in %)
Urban 45.7% 27.5% 26.8% 100%
Semi-Urban 46.9% 31.3% 21.8% 100%
Rural 44.5% 34.2% 21.3% 100%
Cameroon 51.7% 30.0% 18.3% 100%
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Figure 2: The map of monetary and non monetary inequalities (Cameroon 2001)
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4 Conclusion
There is a growing interest in studying the negative aspects in distribution of wealth
in developing countries during the last few decades. At the same time, the perception of
individual well-being was revised to include the real abilities of the person to transform re-
sources into valuable activities. In this line, there is consensus about the multidimensional
nature of well-being. Besides the importance of assessing the deprivation in well-being,
one can agree with the need of assessing inequality within the non monetary dimensions,
like education, health and basic infrastructures and where the latter represents the main
ingredients to develop the human capital and to give a chance to escape from poverty. Eth-
ically, it is desirable that population will have equivalent opportunities to access to public
goods. This requires in its turn to reduce disparities in the provision of these goods.
In this paper, we propose a new index that may help in assess and analyze the multi-
dimensional inequality. The proposed hybrid MDI index has a more flexible functional
form to reflect the antagonism in the multi aspects of social preferences. It satisfies the
main desirable properties and allows to establish a complete order for the social welfare,
and this by considering the multidimensional aspect of well-being. In addition, this index
is easily interpretable considering its functional form and their easily understandable com-
ponents. Moreover, this index is multi-level decomposable by components or dimensions,
and by the uni- and multi-dimensional forms of inequality. This property allows shaping
anti-inequality policies to fight simultaneously against the different forms of inequality.
Results of the application conducted with the 2001 Cameroonian data confirm the
rural nature of multidimensional inequality. The decomposition of MDI index shows
that housing dimension, that is more correlated with monetary indicators of well-being,
is that which contribute the more to MDI . In addition, the contribution of education is
higher than that of health. These results may guide policymakers in the revision of the
planed expansion in provision of public goods, and this, by improving the repartition of
access to public services. Anti-inequality policies will target more the higher unequal
Cameroonian provinces and especially those less urbanized.
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Appendix 1 Basic indicators of the non monetary
well-being dimensions
Dimension 1: Housing infrastructures and environmental facilities
Occupation status
Type of housing
Number of bedrooms
Source of drinking water
Source of lighting energy
Source cooking energy
Type of garbage vacation
Sanitary facilities
Wall materials
Roof materials
Ground materials
Dimension 2: Education and basic infrastructures
Knowing read and write
Already attended schools
First reason of the dissatisfaction of the nearly public primary school
First reason of the dissatisfaction of the nearly private primary school
Distance to go to the nearly public primary school (0,1,2,3,4,5 or 6km and more.)
Distance to go to the nearly private primary school (0,1,2,3,4,5 or 6km and more.)
Required Time to go the nearly primary public school
(0-5min/6-15min/16-25min/26-35min/36-45min/ 46min or more)
Required Time to go the nearly private public school
(0-5min/6-15min/16-25min/26-35min/36-45min/ 46min or more)
Dimension 3: Health and basic infrastructures
Sector of consultation
Type of sanitary center
Appreciation of own health status
First reason of the dissatisfaction of the nearly sanitary center
Distance to go to the nearly sanitary center (0,1,2,3,4,5 or 6km and more.)
Required Time to go the nearly sanitary center
(0-5min/6-15min/16-25min/26-35min/36-45min/ 46min or more)
22
Appendix 2 Categorical coordinates in the bi-dimensional reduced space
(Housing basic infrastructures (Cameroon 2001))
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